

Derandomization (II)

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HARDNESS

Definition

Let $f : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be a function. The *worst-case hardness* of f is defined by

$$H_{\text{wrs}}(f)(n) := \max \left\{ S \in \mathbb{N} \mid \begin{array}{l} \text{every circuit } C \text{ of size at most } S \\ \text{fails to compute } f \text{ on some input in } \{0, 1\}^n \end{array} \right\}$$

for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

Equivalently,

$$H_{\text{wrs}}(f)(n) := \max \left\{ S \in \mathbb{N} \mid \begin{array}{l} \Pr_{x \in \{0, 1\}^n} [C(x) = f(x)] < 1 \\ \text{for every circuit } C \text{ with } |C| \leq S \end{array} \right\}$$

Definition

Let $f : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ be a function. The *average-case hardness* of f is defined by

$$H_{\text{avg}}(f)(n) := \max \left\{ S \in \mathbb{N} \mid \Pr_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} [C(x) = f(x)] < \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{S} \right. \\ \left. \text{for every circuit } C \text{ with } |C| \leq S \right\}$$

for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

1. If $f \in \mathbf{BPP}$ then, since $\mathbf{BPP} \subseteq \mathbf{P/poly}$, both $H_{\text{wrs}}(f)$ and $H_{\text{avg}}(f)$ are bounded by some polynomial.
2. It is conjectured that 3SAT has exponential worst-case hardness, i.e., $H_{\text{wrs}}(3\text{SAT}) \geq 2^{\omega(n)}$. On the other hand, $H_{\text{avg}}(3\text{SAT})$ is unclear.
3. If we trust the security of current cryptosystems, then we do believe that \mathbf{NP} contains functions that are hard on the average.

PSEUDORANDOM GENERATORS

Theorem (Nisan and Wigderson, 1988)

For every time-constructible and nondecreasing function $S : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, if there exists a Boolean function $f \in \mathbf{DTIME}(2^{O(n)})$ such that $H_{\text{avg}}(f) \geq S(n)$ for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, then there exists an $S(\delta \cdot \ell)^\delta$ -pseudorandom generator for some constant $\delta > 0$.

Corollary

If there exists a Boolean function $f \in \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{DTIME}(2^{O(n)})$ and $\varepsilon > 0$ such that

$$H_{\text{avg}}(f) \geq 2^{\varepsilon \cdot n},$$

then there exists a $2^{\lceil \ell/a \rceil}$ -pseudorandom generator. Consequently, $\mathbf{BPP} = \mathbf{P}$.

Theorem (Yao, 1982)

Let Y be a distribution over $\{0, 1\}^m$. Suppose that there exists an $S > 10 \cdot n$ and an $\varepsilon > 0$ such that for every circuit C of size at most $2 \cdot S$ and $i \in [m]$,

$$\Pr_{r \in_R Y} [C(r_1, \dots, r_{i-1}) = r_i] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{m}.$$

Then, Y is (S, ε) -pseudorandom.

Proof (1)

Let $i \in [0, m]$ and consider the distribution Y_i on $\{0, 1\}^m$ generated by the following process.

1. Choose r_1, \dots, r_m according to the distribution Y .
2. Choose $y_{i+1}, \dots, y_m \in \{0, 1\}$ independently and uniformly in random.
3. Output $(r_1, \dots, r_i, y_{i+1}, \dots, y_m)$.

Observe that

$$Y_0 = U_m \quad \text{and} \quad Y_m = Y.$$

Proof (2)

Now assume that Y is not (S, ε) -pseudorandom, i.e., there exists a circuit D of size at most S such that

$$|\Pr[D(Y) = 1] - \Pr[D(U_m) = 1]| \geq \varepsilon.$$

We deduce

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_{i \in [m]} |\Pr[D(Y_i) = 1] - \Pr[D(Y_{i-1}) = 1]| \\ & \geq \left| \sum_{i \in [m]} \Pr[D(Y_i) = 1] - \Pr[D(Y_{i-1}) = 1] \right| \\ & = |\Pr[D(Y) = 1] - \Pr[D(U_m) = 1]| \geq \varepsilon. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, there is a $k \in [m]$ with

$$|\Pr[D(Y_k) = 1] - \Pr[D(Y_{k-1}) = 1]| \geq \frac{\varepsilon}{m}.$$

Proof (3)

Without loss of generality we assume

$$\Pr[D(Y_k) = 1] - \Pr[D(Y_{k-1}) = 1] \geq \frac{\epsilon}{m}.$$

Roughly, it says that r_k is more easy to satisfy D than y_k .

We consider the following randomized algorithm $\mathbb{C}(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1})$

1. Choose $y_k, \dots, y_m \in \{0, 1\}$ independently and uniformly in random.
2. Simulate the circuit D on input $(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1}, y_k, \dots, y_m)$.
3. If the simulation outputs 1, then output y_k , otherwise $1 - y_k$.

We want to calculate

$$\Pr[\mathbb{C}(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1}) = r_k]$$

where the probability is taken over $(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1}, r_k, \dots, r_m) \in_R Y$ and the internal coin tosses of \mathbb{C} (i.e., y_k, \dots, y_m in Line 1).

Proof (4)

Observe that the event E of $\mathbb{C}(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1}) = r_k$ happens if and only if one of the following events happens:

$$(E_1) \ D(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1}, y_k, \dots, y_m) = 1 \text{ and } r_k = y_k.$$

$$(E_2) \ D(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1}, y_k, \dots, y_m) = 0 \text{ and } r_k \neq y_k.$$

Thus, $\Pr[E] = \Pr[E_1] + \Pr[E_2]$.

Then, we rewrite

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[E_1] &= 1/2 \cdot \Pr [D(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1}, y_k, \dots, y_m) = 1 \mid r_k = y_k] \\ &= 1/2 \cdot \Pr [D(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1}, r_k, y_{k+1}, \dots, y_m) = 1] \\ &= 1/2 \cdot \Pr [D(Y_k) = 1], \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[E_2] &= 1/2 \cdot \Pr [D(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1}, y_k, \dots, y_m) = 0 \mid r_k \neq y_k] \\ &= 1/2 \cdot (1 - \Pr [D(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1}, y_k, \dots, y_m) = 1 \mid r_k \neq y_k]). \end{aligned}$$

On the other hand, we observe

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr[D(Y_{k-1}) = 1] &= \Pr[D(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1}, y_k, \dots, y_m) = 1] \\ &= 1/2 \cdot \Pr[D(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1}, y_k, \dots, y_m) = 1 \mid r_k = y_k] \\ &\quad + 1/2 \cdot \Pr[D(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1}, y_k, \dots, y_m) = 1 \mid r_k \neq y_k] \\ &= \Pr[E_1] + 1/2 - \Pr[E_2].\end{aligned}$$

Put all the pieces together:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr[E] &= \Pr[E_1] + \Pr[E_2] \\ &= 1/2 + 2 \cdot \Pr[E_1] - \Pr[D(Y_{k-1}) = 1] \\ &= 1/2 + \Pr[D(Y_k) = 1] - \Pr[D(Y_{k-1}) = 1] \geq 1/2 + \varepsilon/m.\end{aligned}$$

Proof (6)

Now we know

$$\Pr [\mathbb{C}(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1}) = r_k] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{m}.$$

Recall the randomized algorithm \mathbb{C} :

1. Choose $y_k, \dots, y_m \in \{0, 1\}$ independently and uniformly in random.
2. Simulate the circuit D on input $(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1}, y_k, \dots, y_m)$.
3. If the simulation outputs 1, then output y_k , otherwise $1 - y_k$.

Thus there must exist some fixed $z_k, \dots, z_m \in \{0, 1\}$ such that

$$\Pr[D(r_1, \dots, r_{k-1}, z_k, \dots, z_m) = r_k] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{m}.$$

This is a contradiction, as $D(-, \dots, -, z_k, \dots, z_m)$ is a circuit of size at most $2 \cdot S$. □

First toy example

Lemma (One-bit generator)

If there exists an $f \in \mathbf{E}$ with $H_{\text{avg}}(f) \geq n^4$, then there is an $(\ell + 1)$ -pseudorandom generator.

Proof.

Let

$$G(z) = z \circ f(z).$$

By Yao's lemma, it suffices to show that there does not exist a circuit C of size $2 \cdot (\ell + 1)^3 < \ell^4$ and a number $i \in [\ell + 1]$ such that

$$\Pr_{r=G(U_\ell)} [C(r_1, \dots, r_{i-1}) = r_i] > \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{10 \cdot (\ell + 1)}.$$

Assume $i = \ell + 1$, otherwise trivial.

$$\Pr_{z \in_R \{0,1\}^\ell} [C(z) = f(z)] > \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{10 \cdot (\ell + 1)} > \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{\ell^4},$$

which cannot hold under the assumption that $H_{\text{avg}}(f) \geq n^4$. □

Lemma (Two-bit generator)

If there exists an $f \in \mathbf{E}$ with $H_{\text{avg}}(f) \geq n^4$, then there is an $(\ell + 2)$ -pseudorandom generator.

Proof (1)

Let

$$G(z) = z_1 \dots z_{\lceil \ell/2 \rceil} \circ f(z_1, \dots, z_{\lceil \ell/2 \rceil}) \circ z_{\lceil \ell/2 \rceil + 1} \dots z_\ell \circ f(z_{\lceil \ell/2 \rceil}, \dots, z_\ell).$$

By Yao's lemma, it suffices to show that there does not exist a circuit C of size $2 \cdot (\ell + 2)^3$ and a number $i \in [\ell + 2]$ such that

$$\Pr_{r=G(U_\ell)} [C(r_1, \dots, r_{i-1}) = r_i] > \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{10 \cdot (\ell + 2)}.$$

Trivial for $i \neq \lceil \ell/2 + 1 \rceil$ and $i \neq \ell + 2$.

The case of $i = \lceil \ell/2 \rceil + 1$ is the same as the 1-bit case.

Now consider $i = \ell + 2$ and assume

$$\Pr_{r \in_R \{0,1\}^{\lceil \ell/2 \rceil}, r' \in_R \{0,1\}^{\lfloor \ell/2 \rfloor}} [C(r \circ f(r) \circ r') = f(r')] > \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{10 \cdot (\ell + 2)}.$$

THE AVERAGING PRINCIPLE: If A is some event depending on two independent random variables X, Y , then there exists some x in the range of X such that

$$\Pr_Y[A(x, Y)] \geq \Pr_{X,Y}[A(X, Y)].$$

Thus for some fixed $r \in \{0, 1\}^{\lceil \ell/2 \rceil}$

$$\Pr_{r' \in_R \{0,1\}^{\lfloor \ell/2 \rfloor}} [C(r \circ f(r) \circ r') = f(r')] > \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{10 \cdot (\ell + 2)}.$$

Proof (3)

Let

$$D(r') \mapsto C(r \circ f(r) \circ r')$$

be a circuit of size

$$2 \cdot (\ell + 1)^3 + \lceil \ell/2 \rceil + 1 \leq (\ell/2)^4.$$

Hence,

$$\Pr_{r' \in_R \{0,1\}^{\lceil \ell/2 \rceil}} [D(r') = f(r')] > \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{10 \cdot (\ell + 2)} > \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{(\ell/2)^4},$$

contradicting the hardness of f .



THANK YOU